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Abstract
We study how US chief executive officers (CEOs) invest their deferred compensation
plans depending on the firm’s profitability. By looking at the correlation between
the CEO’s return on these plans and the firm’s stock return, we show that deferred
compensation is to a large extent invested in the company equity in good times and
divested from it in bad times. The divestment from company equity in bad times
arguably reflects CEOs’ incentive to abandon the firm and to invest in alternative
instruments to preserve the value of their deferred compensation plans. This result
suggests that the incentive alignment effects of deferred compensation crucially
depend on the firm’s health status.
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1 Introduction
Top executives of US public firms receive an important proportion of their compensation
in the form of retirement benefits. Such benefits are akin to debt-like claims on the firm
and are often called inside debt. As pointed out by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Edmans and Liu (2011), inside debt can align the incentives of managers and creditors,
thus making the former more conservative.1
Yet, several studies suggest a more nuanced view of inside debt incentives. Inside
debt is composed of pensions (rank-and-file plans and supplemental executive retirement
plans) and deferred compensation. Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong (2014) show that the
incentive alignment effect of inside debt is driven by supplemental executive retirement
plans—i.e., the inside debt component most exposed to default risk. In contrast, rank-
and-file plans are protected in bankruptcy, and deferred compensation plans, though often
formally at risk in bankruptcy, allow some flexibility in the schedule of withdrawals, which
can predate the retirement date (and the maturity date of outstanding debt).2 Interest-
ingly, deferred compensation plans also allow substantial flexibility in the investment
strategy, which has the potential to affect managerial risk-taking incentives.
This last aspect has received little attention. An exception is Jackson and Honigsberg
(2014), who show that a substantial proportion of deferred compensation is invested in
the company stock. Hence, deferred compensation may provide managers with an equity-
like payoff and intensify, rather than diminish, managerial risk-taking incentives. Jackson
and Honigsberg (2014) analyze the average investment strategy of deferred compensation
and do not consider the possibility that this strategy changes over time. In contrast, we
focus on the time-varying investment strategy of deferred compensation. In particular,
we analyze theoretically and empirically the manager’s incentives to reallocate his/her
deferred compensation away from company stock when the firm enters a period of low
expected profitability. We then discuss the possible implications of such a reallocation
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strategy for firm risk.
We start by developing a theoretical framework in which the CEO endogenously
decides the allocation of his/her deferred compensation and the level of firm risk. When
the firm’s expected profitability is low, the CEO reallocates the deferred compensation
away from company stock toward assets with higher expected payoffs.
We test this prediction on a large sample of US public firms over the period 2006–2015
by analyzing CEOs’ compensation packages. Given that current disclosure rules do not
require companies to reveal how CEOs’ deferred compensation plans are invested, we
measure the exposure of deferred compensation to company stock by means of the corre-
lation between deferred compensation returns and stock returns. As a preliminary step,
we substantiate the suggestive evidence of Jackson and Honigsberg (2014) by showing
that deferred compensation is indeed significantly linked to company stocks, as witnessed
by the positive, large, and statistically significant correlation exhibited by a substantial
fraction of CEOs in our sample.
We then focus on the time-varying nature of the correlation between CEO deferred
compensation returns and stock returns, which we use as a proxy for the CEO’s invest-
ment strategy over time. We show that such a correlation declines significantly in bad
times (i.e., distressed firm-years), in line with CEOs divesting from the firm stock. We
confirm this finding using the recent financial crisis as a plausibly exogenous shock to
the firm’s distress risk. The decline in the correlation is likely to reflect CEOs’ desire to
abandon the firm during bad times.
Moreover, we do not find evidence that CEOs use private information to time the
market by means of their deferred compensation investment strategy. However, CEOs
appear to be quicker to react to worsened firm conditions through the asset allocation
of deferred compensation plans than through trading on traditional stock incentives,
possibly because of the more intense scrutiny the latter receive from investors.
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Using our theoretical setting, we then discuss the possible implications of CEO invest-
ment strategy of deferred compensation for firm risk. By divesting deferred compensation
away from firm equity, the CEO can limit losses in case of default. In bad times, the
reallocation strategy of deferred compensation works as an insurance that allows the
CEO to adopt a sort of gambling for resurrection strategy, increasing the value of equity
through higher cash flow volatility without suffering large expected compensation losses.
The model thus suggests that deferred compensation may induce the CEO to take on
more risk precisely when creditors need more prudent behavior, the effect being stronger
if deferred compensation is large.
Early withdrawals are an alternative/complementary way to limit expected losses on
deferred compensation (Jackson and Honigsberg, 2014) and can therefore lead to in-
creased managerial risk-taking incentives too. We show empirically that in bad times
CEOs tend to alter the investment strategy of deferred compensation, rather than with-
drawing part of their deferred compensation. This is possibly (i) because of the tax
penalty on early withdrawals and (ii) because withdrawals are observable and often crit-
icized by the media, especially when the amount of money involved is substantial, while
the investment strategy of deferred compensation is harder to observe. In other words,
changing the investment strategy of deferred compensation may be associated with lower
monetary and reputational costs, making it more desirable for CEOs than early with-
drawals.
It is worth noting that indirect equity incentives (i.e., those coming from deferred
compensation plans) differ from traditional direct equity incentives (i.e., those coming
from the part of CEO’s wealth directly invested in equity). In the model, the CEO
reduces the fraction of deferred compensation invested in company stock in bad times
and, as a result, takes more risk. In other words, our theoretical setting predicts a
negative relationship between firm risk and indirect equity incentives. Meanwhile, the
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impact of direct equity holdings depends on the interaction of two opposite channels.
When the number of directly held shares increases, the CEO has an incentive to take
more risk to benefit from the positive effect on the value of equity. At the same time, a
surge in firm risk increases the probability of default, which reduces the value of deferred
compensation. Therefore, the relationship between direct equity incentives and firm risk
hinges on the overall effect of firm risk on the value of total CEO compensation. When
deferred compensation is over-invested in company equity, the former channel prevails,
and direct equity holdings have a positive effect on firm risk. Otherwise, the latter channel
prevails, and direct equity holdings have a negative effect on firm risk. In the same spirit,
Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004) show that convex compensation schemes may have
ambiguous effects on CEO risk-taking incentives. We illustrate that this ambiguity can
also be generated by flexibility in the investment strategy of deferred compensation.
2 Literature review
A substantial body of work provides evidence compatible with the risk-reducing role
of inside debt suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Edmans and Liu (2011).
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find a negative relationship between the ratio of inside
debt to inside equity and default risk. Wei and Yermack (2011) show that, after firms’
initial disclosure of top executive retirement plans, bond prices rise while stock prices
decrease. Phan (2014) provides consistent evidence looking at firms’ mergers and acqui-
sitions (M&A) activity, also documenting that acquiring firms adjust the weight of inside
debt relative to equity holdings following M&As to adjust to the new capital structure.
Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2014) illustrate that inside debt helps protect creditors by fa-
voring cash hoarding behavior. Li, Rhee, and Shen (2018) illustrate that firms whose
CEOs hold large inside debt holdings tend to issue less convertible debt, which aligns
with a risk-mitigating role of inside debt provided that convertibles are used by firms
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to curb risk-shifting. Srivastav, Armitage, and Hagendorff (2014) focus on the banking
sector and document that inside debt limits managerial risk-shifting through a reduction
of incentives to divert cash to shareholders. Cassel, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012)
report evidence of a negative relationship between executives’ inside debt holdings and
the volatility of stock returns.
Anantharaman et al. (2014), however, show that inside debt is effective at reducing
the cost of private loans only when it is actually exposed to default risk. Colonnello,
Curatola, and Hoang (2017) extend this result to public debt and illustrate that low-
seniority debt can interact with equity incentives to make CEOs less conservative. Such
an unintended increase in managerial risk-taking is concentrated in bad times (Inderst
and Pfeil, 2013). Goh and Li (2015) document that CEO pensions are unlikely to qualify
as actual inside debt in the UK context, but rather as substitutes for other performance-
sensitive compensation items. Jackson and Honigsberg (2014) question the incentive-
alignment role of deferred compensation plans by documenting that they are on average
heavily invested in firm equity and to a large extent withdrawn by executives after they
leave the firm. Cen and Doukas (2017) look at firm risk-taking and the CEO’s personal
returns on deferred compensation plans, but rather than focusing on their correlation with
the firm stock across different states of the world, the authors examine their unconditional
volatility to infer the CEO’s risk preferences. We complement this literature by studying
how the CEO’s exposure to firm risk through deferred compensation changes over time
depending on his/her personal portfolio choices. We then discuss how this time-varying
exposure of the CEO to the firm can affect his/her risk-taking incentives.
Our paper also speaks to the literature on the hedging behavior of executives in
relation to their company equity holdings. Gao (2010) documents that optimal pay-
performance sensitivity decreases in the hedging costs faced by the CEO. Bettis, Bizjak,
and Lemmon (2001) find that managers use derivative instruments such as zero-cost
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collars and equity swaps to hedge their positions. Anderson and Puleo (2016) show that
managers that hedge themselves by pledging their equity awards to borrow funds take
on more risk. We illustrate that deferred compensation plans may allow executives more
discretion over their exposure to the firm’s idiosyncratic risk.
3 Institutional background
Corporate finance theory suggests that deferred compensation is able to reduce manage-
rial risk-taking incentives if it is unsecured in bankruptcy and delivers a fixed payoff in
good states (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). In practice, deferred
compensation differs from this theoretical benchmark for two reasons: firstly, its recovery
rate in bankruptcy may be higher than that for arm’s length debt and, secondly, CEOs
enjoy substantial flexibility in the investment strategy of deferred compensation plans.
Indeed, the payoff of deferred compensation plans is not fixed, but is linked to the price
of the assets in which deferred compensation is invested.
The differences above depend on the type of deferred compensation plan and its
features which are summarized below.3
3.1 A taxonomy of deferred compensation plans
The first important distinction is between defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution
(DC) plans, which together constitute the inside debt. DB plans come in the form of
pensions and comprise qualified and non-qualified plans. Qualified DB plans are typically
rank-and-file pension schemes regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), and secured and funded by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, whereas
non-qualified DB plans usually come in the form of supplemental executive retirement
plans (SERPs). DB plans promise fixed payments after retirement and are similar to
annuities. The payment is a fraction of the final wages and depends on the manager’s
6
age and contributions up to retirement. Managers do not have discretion over their
investment strategy, making DB plans less prone to the issues analyzed in this paper.4
Therefore, our analysis focuses on DC plans only.
DC plans can also be divided into qualified and non-qualified plans, depending on
whether they are regulated by ERISA. Qualified DC plans are secured in bankruptcy
and allow executives to defer part of their current compensation, which is then invested
in special investment vehicles (typically a Collective Investment Trust). Participants in
these plans have substantial power to decide on the investment strategy of their accounts.
Qualified DC plans are tax-beneficial: managers are taxed at the time they receive the
amount and not when the amount is set aside, and companies obtain tax deductions
for qualified contributions. Because of their tax advantages, the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) limits the amount of money that managers can defer through qualified plans.5
Given such a limit, companies also offer non-qualified DC plans to allow their managers
to organize the distribution of their future income better and—although not explicitly
given a preferential tax treatment—still enjoy a tax advantage under certain conditions.
Non-qualified DC plans are essentially a contract between managers and firms and, thus,
do not have to comply with ERISA requirements but are regulated by the IRC Section
409A. Assets backing non-qualified DC plans—unlike in the case of qualified ones—must
be formally available to general creditors in bankruptcy for these plans to qualify as tax
deferral vehicles according to IRC Section 409A. In other words, executives’ claims on
the firm’s assets through non-qualified DC plans are formally akin to unsecured debt and
thus exposed to forfeiture risk in bankruptcy.
However, non-qualified DC plans’ recovery rates in bankruptcy for executives are
likely to be substantially higher than that for arm’s length debt. Based on anecdotal and
survey evidence, Walker (2018) shows that a large fraction of firms (between 50% and
90%) provides ‘informal funding’ on these plans through (i) a Rabbi trust, and/or (ii) a
7
corporate owned life insurance (COLI). Sometimes COLIs are held within a Rabbi trust.
Walker (2018) suggests that informal funding, especially in the form of a Rabbi trust,
translates into plan participants’ increased protection in bankruptcy.6
One should then consider that in the US (i) the recovery rate on unsecured debt is
substantial, and (ii) deviations from the absolute priority rule (APR), favoring unsecured
over secured creditors, are relatively common. About point (i), Jankowitsch, Nagler,
and Subrahmanyam (2014) report a mean recovery rate of 39.09 percent for unsecured
bonds based on post-default trading prices. Given that public bondholders tend to exhibit
coordination problems, this is arguably a lower bound for the recovery rate on debt claims
held by executives such as the ones we study. About point (ii), Capkun and Weiss (2016),
using a sample of Chapter 11 bankruptcies, find APR violations favoring unsecured over
secured creditors in 16.22 percent of cases. Such APR violations go in the direction of
increasing recovery rates on unsecured debt. As a result, the beneficial effect of DC for
creditors is not obvious.
3.2 The investment strategy of deferred compensation plans
An important aspect of DC plans is their investment options. The investments options
of qualified DC plans, such as 401(k) plans, may include the company’s own stock as a
possible choice. Firms select the investment options available to the plan’s participants,
who can then pick one among them, thus choosing the desired asset allocation for their
own account within the plan. ERISA identifies the plan’s fiduciary as the person (or
corporation) responsible for selecting the investment options and managing the deferred
compensation plan. Typically, the plan sponsor (the employer adopting the plan) acts
as the fiduciary and it is therefore responsible for the deferred compensation plan. In
addition, the plan sponsor may hire an investment advisor who provides investment
recommendations (ERISA section 3(21)), but the plan sponsor maintains control over
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investment decisions. Alternatively, the sponsor may delegate to an external institution
(i.e., a bank or an insurance company) the management function of the plan (ERISA
section 3(38)). These details may be provided in the Investment Policy Statement (IPS).
However, the IPS is not required by ERISA; thus, while some companies provide an IPS,
some do not.
Non-qualified DC plans allow for more flexibility. Those plans are typically restricted
to top executives and designed exclusively for them. Even in this case, the lack of detailed
information on the investment strategy is an issue.7
The empirical literature has tried to understand whether DC plans are invested in
the firm’s own stock or not using surveys and interviews. The results are inconclusive:
some companies declare that they exclude own stock from the investment menu; some
companies allow or even encourage investment in it; but most companies are silent about
this issue. Prominent cases are those of Leggett & Platt Inc., which provides executives
with monetary incentives to link their non-qualified DC plans to company stocks, and
Aetna Inc., which offers only two investment options, namely company stocks and a fixed
income fund. A recent survey suggests that 34 percent of the respondent firms (113)
offered the option to invest non-qualified DC plans in company stocks in 2017, increasing
from 21 percent in 2016 (Newport Group, 2017). Many companies in the survey declare
they offer investment options very similar to those in their 401(k) plan, which are often
invested in company stocks (Mitchell and Utkus, 2002; Meulbroek, 2005; Rauh, 2006;
Park, 2017). These pieces of evidence show that managerial non-qualified DC plans are
likely to be invested in company stocks, but it is problematic to assess to what extent.8
In a recent study, Jackson and Honigsberg (2014) infer the investment strategy of
deferred compensation by looking at the correlation between returns of deferred com-
pensation and stock returns. They find that for a large fraction of listed companies the
correlation between returns on deferred compensation plans and stock returns is higher
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than 80 percent, suggesting that deferred compensation is substantially invested in the
firm’s own stock. This correlation is unlikely to happen by chance and is also unlikely to
be the result of the advice of an external adviser, who would arguably suggest diversifi-
cation rather than investing almost exclusively in one stock. Motivated by this evidence,
below we study how CEOs change the investment strategy of deferred compensation over
time depending on the firm’s profitability.
Another important feature of DC plans is the possibility of making early withdrawals.
For qualified DC plans, the IRS defines an early withdrawal as the withdrawal of a
person younger than 59.5 years of age. In this case, the early withdrawal is subject to
an additional 10 percent tax unless an exemption applies. Discretionary withdrawals
from non-qualified DC plans are not possible before the date specified at the time the
contract is signed (which typically coincides with the expected retirement date), except
under precise circumstances, such as separation from service or serious health problems.9
The penalty for non-justified early withdrawals is particularly severe: the total deferred
amount is included in the current income and taxed at the underpayment rate plus 1
percent. In addition, a penalty tax of 20 percent of the amount included in the current
income is applied.
The final value of DC plans also depends on their managing cost. Such a cost depends
on the selected trust manager and typically includes advisory fees and operating expenses
(i.e., custody, accounting, legal, tax, and record keeping expenses), which may be sub-
tracted from the value of the plan or billed separately. It is interesting to note that those
trusts are not subject to US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration.
For this reason, they carry fewer reporting expenses than comparable mutual funds with
the same investment strategy, and thus typically charge lower fees.
All in all, although to different degrees, both qualified and non-qualified DC plans (i)
allow participants to choose the desired investment strategy of plan assets, and (ii) grant
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some form of protection against general creditors in bankruptcy. These two features of DC
plans amount to departures from the conditions outlined above by Jensen and Meckling
(1976) and Edmans and Liu (2011) under which inside debt has a risk-mitigating effect. In
the next section, we sketch a model that captures such departures, deriving implications
for managers’ choices in relation to plan investment strategy and firm risk-taking.
Because of the data limitations described below, in the remainder of the paper we re-
strict our analysis to non-qualified DC plans. For simplicity, we refer to non-qualified DC
plans as deferred compensation plans, unless otherwise noted. However, our theoretical
arguments arguably hold for qualified DC plans as well.
4 Allocation of deferred compensation plans in bad times
To derive the main hypothesis on CEO investment of deferred compensation plans condi-
tional on firm performance, we extend the model of Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro (2015).10
In their framework, a risk-averse CEO is hired by shareholders and compensated with
fixed salary, equity, and a component linked to the spread on the firm’s credit default
swaps (CDS). The firm has assets in place that can generate three different cash flows:
high, intermediate, or low. The firm defaults if the realized cash flow is low and the CEO
selects firm risk—namely the variance of cash flows. The process of adjusting firm risk is
costly and the cost paid decreases the value of equity. We consider two main departures
from Bolton et al. (2015): (i) we assume that the CEO is risk-neutral and (ii) replace
the CDS component with deferred compensation. Figure 1 displays the timeline of the
model.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Consistently with empirically observed patterns (Jackson and Honigsberg, 2014), we
consider a deferred compensation scheme that allows the CEO to decide how to allocate
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deferred compensation between his/her own firm equity and alternative investments that
deliver a higher payoff in states in which the firm is insolvent. In other words, this contract
allows the CEO to modify the expected value of his/her deferred compensation in two
ways—that is, the CEO can change both firm risk (and thus the probability of default)
and the investment strategy of deferred compensation. We also assume that changing the
investment strategy of deferred compensation is costly for the CEO. This reflects the fact
that the transaction costs associated with changes in the deferred compensation strategy
are detrimental to the plan value.
When the firm’s profitability decreases, the value of equity is low, and this reduces
the CEO’s expected wealth. But the CEO has the possibility to change the investment
strategy of deferred compensation to counteract the effect of equity. Our main hypothesis
is that, in such circumstances, the CEO will reduce the fraction of deferred compensa-
tion invested in company equity and increase the fraction invested in other assets. The
empirical analysis in the next sections focuses on formally testing this hypothesis.
The model also provides insights into the implications of deferred compensation for
CEO risk-taking incentives. As long as the CEO is able to recover a positive proportion of
deferred compensation in default, the change in the investment strategy of deferred com-
pensation creates a buffer against bad states. Such a buffer translates into an insurance
effect, which induces the CEO to increase the optimal level of firm risk in bad states, as
compared to a benchmark contract not allowing any discretion in the investment strategy
of deferred compensation. The additional risk also increases the value of equity, which,
in turn, produces an extra increase in the CEO’s wealth especially through stocks held
directly (i.e. not via deferred compensation).
Due to the difficulty of measuring all these inherently unobservable (and endoge-
nous) quantities and interactions, an empirical analysis of the model’s implications for
risk-taking goes beyond the scope of the paper. However, CEO investment of deferred
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compensation plans is not important per se, but rather for its potential real consequences
in terms of risk-taking. Below, we return to this issue and provide a more in-depth
discussion.
5 Empirical approach and data
In this section, we describe the methodology and the data sources.
5.1 Empirical approach
The initial step is to proxy for the CEO’s investment strategy of his/her deferred com-
pensation plans. We then proceed to outline the design of our empirical tests.
Measuring deferred compensation plans’ investment strategy. We measure the extent to
which deferred compensation is invested in firm equity using the approach suggested by
Jackson and Honigsberg (2014), and look at the correlation between returns on deferred
compensation and stock returns. We compute stock returns as the total market return
on the firm stock over the fiscal year.
The measurement of deferred compensation returns is more challenging. To this end,
we use information on each CEO’s annual earnings from deferred compensation plans.
We employ two different measures of deferred compensation returns. In line with Jackson
and Honigsberg (2014), we compute the first measure of return on deferred compensation
plans over a given fiscal year as:




Earnings denotes the earnings a CEO receives on his/her plans and includes both divi-
dends/coupons and the mark-to-market capital gains. Balance BoY, the aggregate bal-
ance of deferred compensation plans held by the CEO at the beginning of the year, is
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obtained by subtracting earnings and contributions (made by the CEO and the company)
from the balance at the end of the year; that is to say Balance BoY = Balance EoY −
CEO contributions − Company contributions − Earnings .
The second measure is directly adjusted for the withdrawals made by the CEO over the
fiscal year. More specifically, we adjust the denominator by adding back the withdrawals
over the fiscal year, namely:




where Balance BoY (adj.) = Balance BoY + Withdrawals . While this second measure
relies on the assumption that withdrawals are made at the end of the fiscal year—similarly
to Cen and Doukas (2017)—the first relies on the assumption that the withdrawals are
made right before the beginning of the fiscal year. To favor the comparability of our
results with those of Jackson and Honigsberg (2014), we use the first measure as the
baseline.
Empirical design. Our baseline approach, rather than establishing causality, goes in
the direction of capturing endogenous patterns in the investment strategy of deferred
compensation and firm performance that are consistent with the model (see, for example,
Danis, Rettl, and Whited, 2014). Later, however, we also use a plausibly exogenous shock
to distress risk.
We analyze the relationship between returns on deferred compensation and stock
returns in normal and distressed times by estimating the following specification:
Def. comp. returnj,t =β1 · Distress zonei,t + β2 · Stock returni,t
+ β3 · Distress zonei,t · Stock returni,t
+ θ · Control variablesj(i),t + υj + υt + εj,t. (3)
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The subscripts j, i, and t indicate the CEO, the firm, and the year, respectively. Def. comp.
returnj,t is the CEO annual return on deferred compensation over the fiscal year. Stock
returnj,t is the annual stock return over the fiscal year.
To capture distress, we use the Z-score threshold proposed by Altman (1968) based on
a discriminant analysis of bankrupt firms. In particular, Distress zonei,t takes the value
of one if a given firm-year’s Z-score is above -1.81, and zero otherwise (note that, to favor
interpretation, we reverse the Z-score sign relative to the traditional formula, so that our
Z-score is increasing in distress risk). It should be stressed that this definition of distress
not only captures bankrupt or almost bankrupt firms but also those firms experiencing a
significant deterioration in their performance. This way of defining distress is particularly
suitable to study the problem at hand, because it allows us to examine an extended period
before potential default in which a CEO may divest his/her deferred compensation from
the firm stock.
We first estimate regressions without control variables to limit concerns about ‘bad
controls’—that is, about selection bias due to the inclusion of control variables that
are outcome variables themselves (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). For the same reason,
we choose a parsimonious set of control variables. Control variablesj(i),t include CEO
characteristics (age, tenure, and the relative debt-to-equity ratio) and firm size. Age and
tenure provide insights into the CEO’s distance from retirement, which in turn feeds back
into his/her portfolio choices. The relative debt-to-equity ratio, by capturing the CEO’s
alignment with shareholders vis-a-vis creditors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), provides a
sufficient statistic as to the compensation structure’s ability to ameliorate debt-equity
conflicts. The inclusion of firm size mitigates concerns that large firms award system-
atically different packages. Below, we augment specification (3) with further control
variables to account for other motives potentially driving CEOs’ personal investment
strategy.
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Given that our hypothesis relates to the time-varying nature of the investment strat-
egy of deferred compensation plans, we focus on the time-series variation by including
CEO fixed effects υj. These fixed effects, besides filtering out the effect of CEO turnovers,
capture largely time-invariant CEO-specific characteristics, such as skill, risk preferences,
or compensation items that are unlikely to change throughout the CEO’s term (e.g., ex
ante severance pay). Also, some of the most widely explored elements of compensation
tend to exhibit low within-variation—e.g., salary or even CEO ownership, as shown by
(Zhou, 2001)—so that CEO fixed effects should to a large extent absorb them. To con-
trol for changing aggregate economic conditions, we include fiscal year fixed effects υt.
Standard errors are clustered at the CEO level.
Jackson and Honigsberg (2014) show that the unconditional correlation between de-
ferred compensation returns and stock returns is typically very high; therefore we expect
β1 > 0. Our model predicts that in bad times the CEO invests a lower proportion of de-
ferred compensation in company stocks, meaning that we should observe a reduced corre-
lation between deferred compensation returns and stock returns in bad times. Therefore,
according to our main hypothesis, we expect β3 < 0.
5.2 Data and summary statistics
We consider a sample of US public firms from 2006 through 2015 that have executive
compensation information available in Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. We
start our analysis in 2006, because the SEC enhanced disclosure requirements about ex-
ecutive pensions and deferred compensation were enforced starting in 2006. ExecuComp
provides information on non-qualified DC plans in the table ‘Deferred Compensation’.
Information on pensions—i.e., qualified and non-qualified DB plans—is reported in the
table ‘Pension Benefits’. Qualified DC plans, such as 401(k) plans, are covered by nei-
ther of these two tables and thus remain out of our main analysis.11 Given that only
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DC plans allow participants to select the investment strategy, our measures of deferred
compensation returns are based on non-qualified DC plans alone, which are the focus of
the analysis. We then use information on DB plans to compute a comprehensive measure
of the CEO’s inside debt holdings.
We obtain accounting and stock return data from the the Center for Research in
Security Prices/Compustat merged (CCM) database. We require each firm to have traded
ordinary shares (CRSP share code 10 or 11). Governance data are from RiskMetrics. We
exclude financial institutions, utilities, subsidiaries, and firm-years with negative assets
or sales. We also exclude firm-years with missing assets, sales, number of outstanding
shares, and stock price at the fiscal year end.
Throughout our analysis, we focus on CEOs. The final sample, being based on Execu-
Comp data, includes S&P 1500 firms, which are arguably unlikely to file for bankruptcy.
Consistently, our theoretical model describes the behavior of a representative CEO when
the company is in good times or when it is approaching (but is not yet in) bankruptcy.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in our tests. The final
sample includes 969 unique firms. Panel A reports summary statistics over the whole
sample for which we observe CEO deferred compensation returns. Stock returns are
higher and more volatile than deferred compensation returns.12 The average CEO’s
deferred compensation outstanding balance (cumulated over his/her time at the firm)
amounts to 71 percent of inside debt holdings (i.e., the sum of deferred compensation
and pension plans’ balances) and 60 percent of annual compensation. The importance of
deferred compensation relative to inside debt is thus substantial and comparable to the
results found by Anantharaman et al. (2014) on a different sample.13
The Distress zone indicator (equal to one if the Z-score is above -1.81, and zero
otherwise) captures deteriorated firm financial health rather than just full-blown default
(to have a Z-score increasing in distress risk, we reverse its sign relative to the traditional
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definition). This is witnessed by the relatively large fraction of firm-years in the distress
zone (17.7%). Among these, the instances in which default has already clearly manifested
itself are likely to be a minority. We also define the indicator variable Gray zone, which
is equal to one for firm-years with a Z-score between -2.99 and -1.81, the region found
by Altman (1968) to be susceptible to misclassification of distressed vs. non distressed
firms. The fraction of firm-years in the gray zone is 25.4 percent.
Panel B reports summary statistics distinguishing between distressed and non-distressed
firm-years. Whereas average stock returns turn negative in distress, deferred compensa-
tion returns are lower but remain positive, in line with CEOs divesting from their own
company stock.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 2 presents the distribution of the Z-score, distinguishing between the financial
crisis (2008 and 2009) and the other years in the sample. As one would expect, crisis
years are characterized by higher distress risk.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Then, we examine firm exit from the sample within one year of entering the distress
zone. This group of firms includes both firms that file for bankruptcy and firms involved
in M&A deals (in particular as targets, possibly exactly because of financial distress).14
We distinguish between (i) firms that enter the distress zone for the first time and (ii)
firms that were never in distress in our sample, and compute their survival rates at one,
two, and three years. In untabulated results, we find that distressed firms systematically
exit our sample at an higher rate. The survival rate at one, two, and three years is
93.41 percent, 87.02 percent, and 80.56 percent for non-distressed firms, whereas it is
90.38 percent, 84.35 percent, and 72.92 percent for distressed ones. These are substantial
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but not extreme differences, in line with the idea that our distress indicator captures
performance deterioration rather than bankruptcy per se.
All variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. Only deferred
compensation returns are winsorized at the 2.5 percent and 97.5 percent levels, as their
distribution is more prone to outliers (arguably because of measurement error). We
provide detailed definitions of all variables in Appendix Table A.1. All dollar amounts
are expressed in 2010 dollars. Appendix Table A.2 provides information on the selection
of the main estimation samples used in the paper.
6 Results
This section presents the results of our empirical analysis.
6.1 Main findings
Figure 2 shows the correlation between stock returns and our two measures of deferred
compensation returns. Looking at our baseline measure (left graph), we observe that for
a large fraction of CEOs, returns on deferred compensation and stock returns correlate
almost perfectly (i.e., the correlation between the two is larger than 0.9). This correlation
pattern is even more pronounced for our alternative measure of deferred compensation
returns (right panel). This suggests that these CEOs invest nearly all (of the risky
component) of their deferred compensation plans in company stock, as pointed out by
Jackson and Honigsberg (2014).
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
In Table 3, we confirm this prima facie evidence. We regress our two measures of
returns on deferred compensation plans on stock returns (columns 1 and 4). Again, we
find a positive and significant (at 1% level) relationship. This result is robust to the
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inclusion of selected control variables (columns 2 and 5). One may be concerned that
the observed positive relationship is driven by firms whose stocks have a high correlation
with the market: in other words, our result may be due to CEOs investing their plans
in index funds tracking the market (or the industry) rather than in their own company
stock. To address this issue, in columns 3 and 6 we distinguish between idiosyncratic
stock return and market-adjusted industry stock return (see, for example, Peters and
Wagner, 2014). We find that not only the market-adjusted industry component of stock
returns but also the idiosyncratic component enters significantly for our measures of
deferred compensation returns. Hence, CEOs appear indeed to be investing deferred
compensation plans in their own firm stock.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
We then study CEO investment strategy of deferred compensation over different states
of the world. We aim to understand whether the incentives to invest the deferred compen-
sation in company stock change with the firm’s financial conditions. Our main hypothesis
is that if the CEO is able to decide the investment strategy of deferred compensation,
he/she will prefer to mitigate his/her exposure to company stock in bad times. Therefore,
we expect to observe a lower correlation between deferred compensation and company
stock returns when the firm approaches distress. Figure 3 confirms the model’s intuition.
We plot the linear relationship between deferred compensation returns and stock returns
distinguishing between distressed and non-distressed firm-years. In distressed periods,
this relationship is indeed weaker.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
In Table 4, we conduct a similar test in a formal regression analysis. Panel A shows
that the correlation between stock returns and deferred compensation returns in distressed
20
periods is significantly lower than in non-distressed periods, as indicated by the negative
and significant estimated coefficient of Distress×Stock return (columns 1 and 4). Again,
this result is robust to the inclusion of control variables (columns 2 and 5) and to using
the idiosyncratic component of stock return (columns 3 and 6).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Based on the coefficient estimate in column 2 of Panel A (0.183), a one standard
deviation increase in stock returns (41.5%) translates into a 6.9 percent increase in CEO
deferred compensation returns in good times. The coefficient estimate for distressed firm-
years (0.183−0.073) shows that the associated change in deferred compensations returns
in such circumstances is 4.7 percent. In other words, the importance of the own firm
stock’s performance for deferred compensation plans is 31.9 percent lower in bad than in
good states of the world, which illustrates the economic significance of the phenomenon
at hand.
In Panel B, we conduct the same tests but including also the lagged distress indicator
and its interaction with contemporaneous stock returns among the explanatory variables.
For the baseline measure of deferred compensation returns, we find that only the interac-
tion with the lagged distress indicator plays an important role (columns 1 and 2), masking
also the role of contemporaneous distress, whose interaction with stocks returns retains
a negative and sizable coefficient. This result suggests that CEOs may react sluggishly
in their personal investment strategy to changes in the distress status of the firm. Table
OA.3 of the Online Appendix consistently shows that CEOs keep a low exposure to own
equity even after the firm exits the distress zone. When using the alternative measure of
deferred compensation returns (which is directly adjusted for withdrawals), the interac-
tion with both the contemporaneous and the lagged distress indicator exhibit a negative
and statistically significant coefficient (columns 3 and 4).
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6.2 The role of withdrawals
Besides changing the investment strategy of their deferred compensation plans, a CEO
may also make a withdrawal to modify personal exposure to firm risk. In Table 5, we
analyze the role of CEO withdrawals from deferred compensation balances. In columns 1
and 2, we re-examine the relationship between deferred compensation and stock returns
including an indicator variable (Withdrawal) equal to one in firm-years in which CEO
withdrawals from deferred compensation plans are non-zero. Our main results remain
unchanged. The decrease in correlation in bad times does not appear to be driven by
CEO withdrawals. In other words, the decreased correlation is likely to reflect a change
in the CEOs’ investment strategy away from company stock.
In columns 3 and 4, we adopt a different perspective and look at how CEO with-
drawals correlate with stock returns, also conditioned on financial distress. To this end,
we estimate probit regressions of Withdrawal, including industry fixed effects. We ob-
serve that withdrawals do not vary significantly with stock returns and financial distress,
and exhibit a positive and statistically significant relationship only with CEO tenure.
Hence, CEOs do not seem to reduce their exposure to firm risk by cashing out their
deferred compensation during distress. An explanation is that withdrawals in times of
distress may be perceived negatively by investors. In contrast, reshuffling the investment
strategy of deferred compensation away from company stock may allow CEOs to reduce
their exposure to the firm and possibly attract less attention from investors. This result
contributes to the discussion originated by Jackson and Honigsberg (2014), who point
out that the CEO has two options to reduce losses on deferred compensation in distress:
withdrawal or modification of the investment strategy. Our results suggest that the latter
is more likely to be implemented, at least for firms that are distressed but not on the
verge of bankruptcy.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
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In Table OA.1 of the Online Appendix, using manually collected data on CEO trans-
actions on firm equity from SEC’s Form 5 filings, we provide evidence that CEOs do
indeed tend to reduce their exposure to the firm in distress through indirect equity posi-
tions, such as those from deferred compensation plans. In the Online Appendix, we also
conduct further tests relating to the definition of distress (Table OA.2) and to changes
in distress status (Table OA.3).
6.3 The financial crisis as a shock to distress risk
The results so far show that CEOs reduce their deferred compensation plans’ exposure
to the firm in bad times. However, it is interesting to examine whether it is indeed in-
creased distress risk driving the reduction in CEOs’ exposure to the firm through deferred
compensation rather than the other way around.
To this end, we ideally need a shock to firm distress risk that is outside the CEO’s and
the firm’s control. We resort to the recent financial crisis as a plausibly exogenous and
unanticipated shock. The collapse of Lehman Brothers and other events in 2008 triggered
a period of turmoil in the financial industry, which then spread to non-financial firms such
as the ones in our sample. In the spirit of Dong, Halford, and Qiu (2016), we define as
treated those firms whose distress risk—as measured by the Altman’s Z-score—increased
between 2006 (pre-treatment) and 2008 (post-treatment). The control group comprises
firms whose distress risk declined over the same period.
Column 1 of Table 6 reports the results from a triple difference-in-differences spec-
ification over the window from 2006 to 2009.15 In particular, we interact stock returns
with the post-event indicator (Post) and the treatment indicator (Treated). Because our
CEO fixed effects are based on ExecuComp’s CEO identifiers, which capture each unique
CEO-firm combination, the Treated indicator is absorbed by CEO fixed effects. In line
with the main hypothesis, the triple interaction term exhibits a negative and statistically
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significant coefficient. This result is confirmed in column 2, where, to mitigate the poten-
tial influence of firms exhibiting extreme (positive or negative) swings in their financial
health, we restrict the sample to firms whose absolute change in the Z-score between 2006
and 2008 is within the 90th percentile.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
These findings point to a direct effect of distress risk on CEOs’ choice to reduce their
exposure to firm risk through deferred compensation. CEOs’ reaction to the financial
crisis arguably reflects both public information (e.g., available financial statements) and
private information (e.g., soft information about the firm’s actual exposure to troubled
banks), so we try below to disentangle these two channels by looking at the timing of
changes in CEOs’ personal investment strategy around the onset of distress.
6.4 CEO trading activity around the onset of distress
We analyze CEOs’ returns on deferred compensation as opposed to their trading activity
on traditional equity incentives—i.e., their portfolio of company stock. We infer the
CEO’s stock trading behavior by implementing the algorithm of Clementi and Cooley
(2009) and Morales (2015), through which we obtain the net trading revenues from selling
firm stock and the net number of shares sold. Such trading activity reflects both shares
directly traded by the CEO and those obtained through the exercise of stock options.16
In the spirit of an event study, we look at the dynamics of CEO deferred compensation
returns and stock trading activity vis-à-vis overall firm equity performance around the
first insurgence of distress in our sample period. More specifically, we look at firms that
at the beginning of our sample are not in in the distress zone and subsequently become
distressed. To be included in this analysis, we require that firms have at least one year
of information about deferred compensation returns before the onset of distress.
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The left graphs of Figure 4 visualize the median CEO deferred compensation return
and firm stock return (left axis) against the median CEO net revenue from stock trading
(right axis), while the right graphs show the same median returns (left axis) against the
fraction of CEOs that actively sell shares during the year (right axis) in the three years
around the first insurgence of distress. The graphs in Panel A are based on the entire
sample of firms described above (127 firms).
The graphs in Panel B restrict the analysis to firms that do not exit the distress
zone in the three years after the onset of distress (55 firms).17 Looking at these firms
helps understand CEOs’ behavior in those cases in which poor performance persists. The
graphs in Panel C are based on firms whose CEO is not replaced over the relevant event
window (51 firms). This subsample provides a glimpse into the investment strategies
of those CEOs that are supported by shareholders during episodes of distress (e.g., be-
cause they are implementing a long-term turnaround strategy or because they are too
powerful/entrenched to be removed).
The patterns illustrated in Figure 4 provide suggestive evidence on two aspects.
1. Private vs. public information. If CEOs showed some ability to time the overall perfor-
mance of firm stock, this would point to some degree of reliance on private information
in their trading decisions. Given that we only observe deferred compensation returns
at annual frequency, we can only provide a coarse analysis of CEOs’ timing abilities.
Figure 4, in line with Table 4, suggests that CEOs indeed reduce the exposure of their
deferred compensation plans to firm stock around the onset of distress (Panel A). The
reduction in correlation seems more pronounced for those CEOs that are not replaced
over our event window (Panel C). However, CEOs still appear to earn low deferred
compensation returns in the year of onset of distress. In other words, CEOs do reduce
exposure of deferred compensation plans to firm equity as distress emerges, but they
do not seem able/willing to anticipate it, which points to a limited role of private
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information in their investment strategy.
2. CEO stock trading activity. Traditional stock incentives may be more scrutinized by
investors than deferred compensation plans, which may make CEOs more reluctant
to sell large holdings of such shares at times of distress. The graphs on the left in
Figure 4 show some (small) increase in the net revenues from stock sales at the onset
of distress and in year −1, followed by a sharp drop in year 1. However, these changes
are driven to a large extent by changes in stock prices. Indeed, looking simply at the
fraction of CEOs that undertake net sales of shares over a given year (graphs on the
right in Figure 4), the pattern—although overall trending down from year −2 until
year 1—appears remarkably stable at roughly 75 percent, thus suggesting that CEOs’
selling activity does not change substantially over time. Such a fraction appears to
pick up only in year 2 or 3. All in all, this suggests that CEOs’ trading on equity
incentives is not strongly influenced by private information in line with Armstrong,
Core, and Guay (2015), and adjustment to distress may be slower than for deferred
compensation plans, possibly because of more intense scrutiny by investors.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
6.5 Additional control variables
In our baseline results, we keep control variables to a minimum to mitigate concerns about
‘bad controls’ (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). However, there may still be confounding
factors at work that are captured neither by our set of control variables nor by our set of
fixed effects.
In Table 7, we directly control for further prominent factors. Whereas in the baseline
specification we control for compensation structure by means of CEO relative D/E ratio,
here in column 1 we also include a set of control variables aimed at better capturing the
firm’s (and the CEO’s) ability to modify his/her exposure to firm risk. For instance, the
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compensation committee may counter the CEO’s decision to reduce firm equity holdings
in deferred compensation plans by increasing his/her incentive compensation, through
stocks or incentives. We thus control for the CEO’s exposure to the firm through effective
ownership, which reflects his/her direct equity holdings both from stocks and options.
Similarly, we account for the risk-taking implications of CEO option holdings through
the vega of his/her portfolio of incentives. At the same time, the CEO him/herself may
decide to amplify or mitigate the changes in his/her exposure to firm risk induced by
deferred compensation allocation through option exercising behavior. Because of this,
we control for the CEO’s proceeds from option exercises (relative to total compensation)
over the year.
In column 2, we augment the specification with Acquisitions, measuring the firm’s
M&A activity. As pointed out by Phan (2014), acquiring firms are likely to change the
weight of inside debt relative to equity incentives to align it with the new capital structure
following M&As. In column 3, we control for other governance mechanisms in place in
the firm by including the E-index of Bebchuck, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). A CEO’s
ability to modify his/her deferred compensation investment strategy and firm risk-taking
is indeed arguably affected by the quality of corporate governance.
We then control for a different set of fixed effects, which should relieve concerns about
omitted variables. In column 4, we replace CEO fixed effects with firm fixed effects. Firm
fixed effects allow us to explore how sensitive the analysis is to changes in the correlation
between deferred compensation and stock returns related to CEO turnovers. In column 5,
we use calendar (rather than fiscal) year fixed effects. In column 6, to control for seasonal
patterns, we control for fiscal year fixed effects and month of fiscal year-end fixed effects.
In each case, the results remain supportive of our main hypothesis. Interestingly, the
decline in the correlation of deferred compensation returns with stocks returns in distress
becomes more pronounced once the effect of CEO turnovers is not filtered out through
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CEO fixed effects (column 4).
[Insert Table 7 about here]
In sum, these results corroborate the importance of the CEO divestment from firm
equity taking place in bad times through deferred compensation plans. Such a divestment
is not explained by changes in other compensation or governance mechanisms and thus
unlikely to be offset by them. To put it differently, adjustment to the CEO investment
strategy of deferred compensation may to a large extent go unnoticed and pose doubts
in terms of the risk-taking implications of this form of compensation, which we discuss
below.
7 Discussion
The results in Section 6 support the main hypothesis that, when the firm’s profitability
is low, CEOs ‘abandon ship’ by divesting deferred compensation away from firm equity.
While interesting, this finding is especially important for its possible consequences for
CEO risk-taking incentives. With the help of our theoretical framework (see Appendix
Section A.1 for details), here we explore such consequences.
Flexibility in the investment strategy of deferred compensation may induce the CEO in
our model to take on more or less risk, as compared to a benchmark deferred compensation
contract without such flexibility (henceforth the “non-discretionary contract”), depending
on the firm’s profitability. When the expected payoff on company stock is sufficiently
larger than that of alternative investments, the CEO may decide to overweight company
stock in deferred compensation plans—that is, to short-sell the alternative assets, and
invest the proceeds in the company stock. The CEO realizes a loss on the short-selling
strategy in case of default, which may induce him/her to take less risk ex ante than under
the non-discretionary contract to prevent this from happening.
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Although interesting from a theoretical point of view, this result is unlikely to occur
because it would require the CEO to borrow against his/her deferred compensation to buy
additional shares of the company stock. When the firm’s profitability is not high enough
or short sales are forbidden, the payoff of alternative investments works as an insurance
against default, inducing the CEO to take more risk than under the non-discretionary
contract. Especially when the firm’s profitability is low, the CEO increases the fraction
of deferred compensation invested in alternative assets, thus reinforcing this mechanism.
The CEO in the model, besides holding firm equity indirectly through deferred com-
pensation, also holds it directly through traditional equity awards (e.g., restricted stocks
and options). His/her allocation of deferred compensation plans between company equity
and alternative investments hence affects traditional equity awards’ risk-taking incentives
and this effect depends again on the company profitability. Recall that firm equity is a
call option on asset cash flows; therefore its value depends positively on cash flow volatil-
ity. This implies that, under the non-discretionary contract, the CEO always increases
(decreases) risk when the shares of directly held (i.e., not via deferred compensation)
equity increases (decreases). In this case, a traditional sale of equity produces the usual
result of mitigating the risk-taking incentives of a risk-neutral CEO.18
Under the discretionary contract, the value of deferred compensation is no longer
constant but depends on its investment strategy which, in turn, is linked to the firm’s
profitability. On the one hand, higher firm risk increases the value of equity held (both
directly and indirectly) by the CEO, and thus the value of his/her compensation. On
the other hand, higher risk means higher probability of default, and reduces the value of
deferred compensation. As explained above, when the firm’s expected payoff is sufficiently
larger than that of alternative investments, the CEO may find it optimal to overweight
company stocks in deferred compensation plans. In this case, the value-increasing effect of
risk on equity dominates, hence giving the CEO an incentive to increase firm risk following
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an increase in directly held firm equity. When company profitability is not high enough
or short sales are forbidden, the effect of risk on the probability of default dominates,
and the CEO has an incentive to reduce firm risk after an increase in directly held
firm equity. Similarly, Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004) find that convex compensation
schemes do not necessarily increase CEO risk-taking incentives. Our model suggests that
the flexibility in the investment strategy of deferred compensation also has the potential
to change the risk-taking incentives of traditional equity awards.
The risk-taking implications of indirectly held company stock are less ambiguous. In
particular, an increase in the amount of equity held through deferred compensation re-
duces risk-taking incentives. This is so because direct and indirect equity holdings have
a different contractual nature in our model. Direct equity holdings are (exogenously)
decided by the shareholders at the time the contract is signed. If the amount of di-
rectly awarded company stock changes, the CEO reacts by adjusting firm risk ex ante
and his/her optimal choice depends on the overall impact of firm risk on the value of
his/her deferred compensation. Meanwhile, the amount of equity held through deferred
compensation is (endogenously) decided by the CEO according to the firm’s profitability.
The CEO finds it optimal to increase his/her indirect investment in company equity in
good times—i.e., exactly when he/she seeks to reduce firm risk to maximize the proba-
bility of receiving his/her deferred compensation. Thus, our model predicts a negative
relationship between indirectly held company equity and firm risk.
All in all, the risk-taking implications of flexibility in the investment strategy of de-
ferred compensation plans are potentially important, especially for creditors. However,
analyzing the empirical relation between CEO investment strategy of deferred compen-
sation and firm risk is challenging for several reasons. Besides the hard-to-observe nature
of the deferred compensation investment strategy pointed out above, firm’s profitability
and risk are both endogenous variables, raising obvious identification concerns. These
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issues deserve further investigation, but exceed the scope of this paper.
8 Conclusion
The recent literature on executive compensation suggests that inside debt induces CEOs
to behave more conservatively and, in this way, helps protect creditors from the risk of
default. However, to serve this purpose, inside debt has to provide CEOs with debt-like
payoffs and expose CEOs and creditors to the same default risk. But what happens if
CEOs can invest the inside debt with the goal of protecting their expected compensation
against the possibility of default?
We focus on the component of inside debt that allows such behavior—i.e., deferred
compensation plans. The theory and the empirical evidence provided in our paper suggest
that the CEO may change his/her deferred compensation asset allocation strategically to
increase expected compensation in states in which deferred compensation contracts are
supposed to deliver a low payoff, namely in default.
We argue that, as a result, deferred compensation may increase, rather than decrease,
risk-taking incentives. Our theory predicts that the CEO incentive to change the invest-
ment strategy of deferred compensation is most important in distress and, thus, induces
CEOs to increase risk-taking precisely in those periods in which creditors require more
prudent behavior. We leave the empirical analysis of these risk-taking conjectures for
future research.
Our results have implications for the ongoing policy debate. It is inadequate to assume
that bonus deferral would unambiguously decrease risk-taking incentives. Moreover, it
is important to have information not only about the investment strategy of deferred




























Figure 1: Timeline of the model
This figure visualizes the timeline of the model (see Appendix A.1 for details), introducing the distinction between time
t = 0− and t = 0 to favor intuition. At t = 0−, a given CEO compensation contract is in place (containing salary, equity
incentives, and deferred compensation) and the CEO observes the firm’s expected profitability. At t = 0, the manager
selects (i) the variance of the firm’s investment technology and (ii) personal exposure to firm equity through deferred
compensation, in such a way to maximize his/her expected wealth. At t = 1, the payoff of investment is realized and
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Figure 2: Correlation between stock returns and CEO deferred compensation returns
This figure shows the distribution of correlation between deferred compensation returns and stock returns across CEOs.
Correlation is computed for CEOs with at least four observations available. Left panel shows the correlation between stock
return and CEO deferred compensation return (baseline measure), which is computed by dividing the CEO annual earnings
by the beginning-of-year deferred compensation plans’ balance. Right panel shows the correlation between stock return
and an alternative measure of CEO deferred compensation return adjusted for CEO withdrawals over the year by adding
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Figure 3: Relation between stock returns and deferred compensation returns
This figure shows CEO deferred compensation returns (baseline measure, i.e., CEO annual earnings on deferred compen-
sations plans divided by their beginning-of-year balance) and stock returns. The fitted lines are estimated using an OLS
regression of deferred compensation returns on stock returns distinguishing firm-years inside and outside the distress zone.
Outliers are omitted.
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Figure 4: Returns on deferred compensation and stock vs. stock trading activity
This figure plots the median CEO deferred compensation return (baseline measure, i.e., CEO annual earnings on deferred
compensations plans divided by their beginning-of-year balance) and firm stock return against the median CEO net revenue
from stock trading (left graphs) and the fraction of CEOs that actively sell shares during the year (right graphs) around
the onset of distress. The horizontal axis shows years in event-time. The graphs in Panel A are based on all firms in our
sample that enter the distress zone. The graphs in Panel B focus on firms that do not exit the distress zone. The graphs
in Panel C focus on firms that do not replace the CEO after they enter the distress zone.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics of the variables used in the paper. The sample includes 969 US firms over the period
2006-2015 for which information on CEO deferred compensation returns is available. We obtain executive compensation
data from ExecuComp, accounting and stock market data from CCM, and corporate governance data from Riskmetrics.
All dollar amounts are in 2010 constant dollars. Panel A reports the summary statistics for the full sample. Panel B
reports the summary statistics distinguishing between firm-years in the distress zone (i.e., with a Z-score above -1.81) and
the rest of the sample. Refer to Appendix Table A.1 for variable definitions.
Panel A: Full sample
Mean St. dev. P25 Med. P75 Obs.
Returns
Deferred compensation return 0.082 0.312 0.000 0.065 0.160 6,097
Deferred compensation return (alt.) 0.074 0.204 0.001 0.063 0.152 5,971
Stock return 0.117 0.415 -0.127 0.095 0.312 6,042
Idiosyncratic stock return -0.001 0.350 -0.187 -0.006 0.182 6,012
Market-adj. industry stock return 0.028 0.171 -0.065 0.007 0.102 6,010
Distress measures
Z-score -3.761 2.882 -4.770 -3.291 -2.159 5,947
Distress zone 0.177 0.382 0.000 0.000 0.000 5,947
Gray zone 0.254 0.435 0.000 0.000 1.000 5,947
Z-score (top 25%) 0.119 0.324 0.000 0.000 0.000 5,947
CEO characteristics and compensation
CEO age 56.280 6.491 52.000 56.000 60.000 6,097
CEO tenure 6.694 6.506 2.000 5.000 9.000 6,097
CEO turnover 0.116 0.321 0.000 0.000 0.000 6,097
CEO effective ownership 0.019 0.037 0.003 0.008 0.017 6,097
CEO vega 155.437 210.198 21.027 76.537 198.945 6,097
CEO exercised options 0.432 1.011 0.000 0.000 0.408 6,090
CEO def. comp. (scaled by inside debt) 0.709 0.370 0.328 1.000 1.000 6,097
CEO def. comp. (scaled by ann. comp.) 0.600 0.867 0.101 0.277 0.671 6,092
CEO relative D/E ratio 3.598 12.580 0.149 0.530 1.687 5,670
Withdrawal 0.112 0.315 0.000 0.000 0.000 6,097
Firm characteristics
Size 8.093 1.431 7.013 7.970 9.074 6,097
E-index 3.397 1.250 3.000 3.000 4.000 5,603
Cash acquisitions 0.036 0.089 0.000 0.002 0.025 5,657
(Continued)
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Table 1: – Continued
Panel B: Distressed vs. non-distressed firms
Outside distress zone Inside distress zone
Obs. Mean St. dev. Obs. Mean St. dev.
Returns
Deferred compensation return 5,042 0.089 0.309 1,055 0.049 0.327
Deferred compensation return (alt.) 4,942 0.082 0.202 1,029 0.036 0.210
Stock return 5,005 0.144 0.384 1,037 -0.011 0.519
Idiosyncratic stock return 4,975 0.012 0.342 1,037 -0.063 0.376
Market-adj. industry stock return 4,960 0.036 0.164 1,050 -0.007 0.197
Distress measures
Z-score 4,892 -4.409 2.651 1,055 -0.756 1.805
Distress zone 4,892 0.000 0.000 1,055 1.000 0.000
Gray zone 4,892 0.309 0.462 1,055 0.000 0.000
Z-score (top 25%) 4,892 0.000 0.000 1,055 0.672 0.470
CEO characteristics and compensation
CEO age 5,042 56.362 6.549 1,055 55.886 6.192
CEO tenure 5,042 6.735 6.535 1,055 6.500 6.366
CEO turnover 5,042 0.118 0.322 1,055 0.110 0.313
CEO effective ownership 5,042 0.020 0.039 1,055 0.014 0.025
CEO vega 5,042 163.389 215.829 1,055 117.433 176.079
CEO exercised options 5,035 0.485 1.065 1,055 0.180 0.639
CEO def. comp. (scaled by inside debt) 5,042 0.712 0.366 1,055 0.694 0.385
CEO def. comp. (scaled by ann. comp.) 5,037 0.634 0.900 1,055 0.437 0.661
CEO relative D/E ratio 4,635 4.100 13.337 1,035 1.353 8.018
Withdrawal 5,042 0.110 0.313 1,055 0.121 0.327
Firm characteristics
Size 5,042 8.026 1.417 1,055 8.415 1.457
E-index 4,698 3.408 1.250 905 3.339 1.244
Cash acquisitions 4,684 0.034 0.081 973 0.044 0.122
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Table 2: Distribution of the Z-score
This table shows the distribution of the Z-score in crisis years (2008 and 2009) and non-crisis years. The Z-score is defined
as −3.3 × Pretax income/Total assets − Sales/Total assets − 1.4 × Retained earnings/Total assets − 1.2×(Current
assets−Current liabilities)/Total assets − 0.6×Market capitalization/Book liabilities. The two bottom rows report the
fraction of firm-years belonging to the gray zone (Z-score between -2.99 and -1.81) and the distress zone (Z-score above
-1.81). The sample includes those observations for which information on CEO deferred compensation returns is available.
Refer to Appendix Table A.1 for detailed variable definitions.










Gray zone 0.291 0.243
Distress zone 0.210 0.168
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Table 3: Deferred compensation returns and stock returns
This table reports panel regressions of CEO deferred compensation returns on stock returns over the period 2006-2015.
The specifications are estimated for two different measures of CEO deferred compensation returns as dependent variable:
(i) the baseline measure, i.e., CEO annual earnings on deferred compensations plans divided by their beginning-of-year
balance (columns 1 through 3), and (ii) a measure adjusted for CEO withdrawals over the year by adding them back to
the beginning-of-year balance of the plans (columns 4 through 6). Columns 1 and 4 estimate the baseline specification.
Columns 2 and 5 control also for size (natural logarithm of total assets), CEO age, CEO tenure, and the CEO relative D/E
ratio (ratio of CEO inside debt holdings to equity incentives divided by the firm’s D/E ratio). Columns 3 and 6 distinguish
between idiosyncratic stock returns (difference between stock return and the equally weighted industry return) and market-
adjusted industry stock returns (difference between the equally weighted industry return and the equally weighted market
return), both based on returns for Fama-French 48 industry groups. All specifications include CEO fixed effects and year
fixed effects. The t-statistics are calculated with robust standard errors clustered by CEO. Significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗, respectively. Refer to Appendix Table A.1 for detailed variable definitions.
Def. comp. return Def. comp. return (alt.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stock return 0.165∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(9.31) (9.05) (13.01) (13.02)
Idio. stock return 0.127∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(6.57) (9.22)
Market-adj. ind. stock return 0.188∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(5.47) (8.10)
Size 0.005 0.005 -0.007 -0.008
(0.23) (0.21) (-0.55) (-0.62)
CEO age 0.008 0.009 -0.002 -0.000
(0.50) (0.56) (-0.15) (-0.03)
CEO tenure -0.003 -0.006 -0.000 -0.004
(-0.10) (-0.19) (-0.02) (-0.17)
CEO relative D/E ratio 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.000 0.000
(1.87) (1.95) (1.30) (1.23)
CEO FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,679 5,286 5,218 5,564 5,189 5,122
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.34 0.34 0.31
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Table 4: Deferred compensation returns, stock returns, and distress
This table reports panel regressions of CEO deferred compensation returns on stock returns conditioning on firms’ distress
status over the period 2006-2015. Panel A analyzes the unconditional relation between deferred compensation returns
and stock returns, interacting stock returns with Distress zone, an indicator variable equal to one if a firm-year exhibits
a Z-score above -1.81. The specifications are estimated for two different measures of CEO deferred compensation returns
as dependent variable: (i) the baseline measure, i.e., CEO annual earnings on deferred compensations plans divided by
their beginning-of-year balance (columns 1 through 3), and (ii) a measure adjusted for CEO withdrawals over the year by
adding them back to the beginning-of-year balance of the plans (columns 4 through 6). Columns 1 and 4 estimate the
baseline specification. Columns 2 and 5 control also for size (natural logarithm of total assets), CEO age, CEO tenure,
and the CEO relative D/E ratio (ratio of CEO inside debt holdings to equity incentives divided by the firm’s D/E ratio).
Columns 3 and 6 distinguish between idiosyncratic stock returns (difference between stock return and the equally weighted
industry return) and market-adjusted industry stock returns (difference between the equally weighted industry return and
the equally weighted market return), both based on returns for Fama-French 48 industry groups. Panel B estimates the
same specifications as in columns 1-2 and 4-5 of Panel A but including also the lagged Distress zone indicator and its
interaction with contemporaneous stock returns. All specifications include CEO fixed effects and year fixed effects. The
t-statistics are calculated with robust standard errors clustered by CEO. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is
indicated by ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗, respectively. Refer to Appendix Table A.1 for detailed variable definitions.
Panel A: Distressed vs. non-distressed firms
Def. comp. return Def. comp. return (alt.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distress zone × Stock return -0.086∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗
(-2.84) (-2.38) (-4.46) (-4.46)
Stock return 0.184∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(8.73) (8.17) (13.13) (13.13)
Distress zone × Idio. stock return -0.087∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(-2.49) (-4.30)
Idio. stock return 0.144∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(6.10) (9.45)
Distress zone × Market-adj. ind. stock return -0.160∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗
(-2.10) (-3.54)
Market-adj. ind. stock return 0.225∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗
(5.57) (8.73)
Distress zone 0.019 0.016 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.015
(0.95) (0.80) (0.16) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-1.17)
Size 0.006 0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(0.26) (0.24) (-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.50)
CEO age 0.016 0.017 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.88) (0.93) (0.27) (0.27) (0.37)
CEO tenure -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005
(-0.09) (-0.20) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.22)
CEO relative D/E ratio 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.86) (1.95) (1.21) (1.21) (1.17)
CEO FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,535 5,145 5,080 5,049 5,049 4,985
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.34 0.34 0.32
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Panel B: Distressed vs. non-distressed firms (timing of distress)
Def. comp. return Def. comp. return (alt.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distress zone × Stock return -0.032 -0.021 -0.049∗∗ -0.043∗∗
(-0.95) (-0.62) (-2.28) (-1.98)
Distress zone -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(-0.22) (-0.09) (-0.25) (-0.09)
Distress zone (lagged) × Stock return -0.080∗∗ -0.080∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗
(-2.28) (-2.22) (-2.79) (-2.76)
Distress zone (lagged) 0.051∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.022 0.022
(2.20) (2.21) (1.36) (1.31)
Stock return 0.199∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(8.03) (7.59) (12.06) (11.68)
Size -0.001 -0.010
(-0.03) (-0.69)
CEO age 0.003 0.008
(0.08) (0.20)
CEO tenure 0.022 0.018
(0.88) (0.86)
CEO relative D/E ratio 0.001∗ 0.000
(1.81) (1.15)
CEO FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,363 4,064 4,315 4,021
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.25 0.38 0.37
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Table 5: The role of CEO withdrawals from deferred compensation plans
This table analyzes the role of CEO withdrawals from deferred compensation plans over the period 2006-2015. Withdrawals
are measured by means of the indicator variable Withdrawal, which is equal to one if the CEO withdraws a non-zero
amount from his/her deferred compensation balance in a given year. Columns 1 and 2 report linear regressions of CEO
deferred compensation returns (baseline measure, i.e., CEO annual earnings on deferred compensations plans divided by
their beginning-of-year balance) on stock returns, including Withdrawal as a control variable. Columns 3 and 4 report
probit regressions of Withdrawal on stock returns. Odd-numbered columns analyze the relation between the dependent
variable and stock returns. Even-numbered columns analyze the relation between the dependent variable and stock returns
conditional on the firm’s financial distress as measured by Distress zone, an indicator variable equal to one if a firm-year
exhibits a Z-score above -1.81. Columns 1 and 2 include CEO fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 include industry (Fama-French
48) fixed effects. All specifications include year fixed effects and control variables: Size (natural logarithm of total assets),
CEO age, CEO tenure, and the CEO relative D/E ratio (ratio of CEO inside debt holdings to equity incentives divided
by the firm’s D/E ratio). The t-statistics are calculated with robust standard errors clustered by CEO. Significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗, respectively. Refer to Appendix Table A.1 for detailed variable
definitions.
Def. comp. return Withdrawal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distress zone × Stock return -0.073∗∗ -0.147
(-2.38) (-1.20)
Distress zone 0.014 0.115
(0.68) (1.25)
Stock return 0.167∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ -0.037 0.058
(9.05) (8.16) (-0.63) (0.87)




Size 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.004
(0.22) (0.26) (0.11) (0.10)
CEO age 0.008 0.016 -0.001 -0.002
(0.50) (0.88) (-0.17) (-0.23)
CEO tenure -0.004 -0.003 0.012∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(-0.12) (-0.10) (2.08) (2.16)
CEO relative D/E ratio 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.002 0.003
(1.88) (1.88) (1.07) (1.32)
CEO FE Yes Yes No No
Industry FE No No Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,286 5,145 5,482 5,352
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.20
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04
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Table 6: The financial crisis as a shock to distress risk
This table reports panel regressions of CEO deferred compensation returns (baseline measure, i.e., CEO annual earnings
on deferred compensations plans divided by their beginning-of-year balance) on stock returns using the financial crisis as a
quasi-experiment giving rise to a plausibly exogenous positive shock to firms’ distress risk. The sample period is 2006-2009.
The treatment indicator variable Treated is equal to one if the firm’s Z-score increases between 2006 and 2008, and zero
otherwise. The indicator variable Post is equal to one from 2008 onward. Column 1 interacts stock returns with Treated
and Post. To reduce the possible influence of firms experiencing extreme (positive or negative) swings in their financial
health, column 2 estimates the specification as in column 1 but restricting the sample to those firms whose absolute change
in the Z-score between 2006 and 2008 is below the 90th percentile. All specifications include CEO fixed effects and control
variables: Size (natural logarithm of total assets), CEO age, CEO tenure, and the CEO relative D/E ratio (ratio of CEO
inside debt holdings to equity incentives divided by the firm’s D/E ratio). The t-statistics are calculated with robust
standard errors clustered by CEO. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗, respectively. Refer




Post × Treated × Stock return -0.393∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗
(-2.68) (-2.56)
Treated × Post 0.084∗ 0.082∗
(1.79) (1.74)
Treated × Stock return 0.473∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(3.61) (3.56)








CEO age 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(2.99) (2.95)
CEO tenure 0.052∗∗ 0.051∗∗
(2.18) (2.12)
CEO relative D/E ratio 0.002 0.002
(1.57) (1.37)
CEO FE Yes Yes
Time FE No No
Sample 2006-2009 2006-2009
Observations 1,656 1,614
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.24
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Table 7: Additional control variables
This table augments the baseline regression specification (i.e., column 2 in Panel B of Table 4) with additional control
variables and fixed effects. Column 1 includes the CEO effective ownership (i.e., adjusted for his/her portfolio of option
incentives), CEO vega (vega of the CEO’s portfolio of option incentives), and CEO exercised options (value of the CEO’s
option exercises scaled by total annual compensation). Column 2 adds a measure of the firm’s M&A activity (cash
acquisitions scaled by total assets). Column 3 adds the E-index of corporate governance proposed by Bebchuck et al.
(2009). Column 4 replaces CEO fixed effects with firm fixed effects. Column 5 replaces fiscal year fixed effects with
calendar year fixed effects. Column 6 includes month of fiscal year-end fixed effects. All specifications include baseline
control variables: Size (natural logarithm of total assets), CEO age, CEO tenure, and the CEO relative D/E ratio (ratio
of CEO inside debt holdings to equity incentives divided by the firm’s D/E ratio). The t-statistics are calculated with
robust standard errors clustered by CEO (except in column 4, where standards errors are clustered by firm). Significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗, respectively. Refer to Appendix Table A.1 for detailed variable
definitions.
Def. comp. return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distress zone × Stock return -0.073∗∗ -0.068∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗
(-2.38) (-2.08) (-2.62) (-3.15) (-2.63) (-2.51)
Distress zone 0.017 0.023 0.017 0.016 0.013 0.021
(0.87) (1.14) (0.84) (0.93) (0.60) (1.01)
Stock return 0.182∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(8.12) (7.83) (8.30) (8.61) (10.25) (8.26)
Size 0.006 0.019 0.007 0.001 0.012 0.005
(0.27) (0.76) (0.27) (0.06) (0.43) (0.17)
CEO age 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.002 0.025 0.014
(0.83) (0.88) (0.75) (1.07) (1.19) (0.75)
CEO tenure -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.006
(-0.10) (-0.16) (-0.22) (-3.07) (-0.23) (-0.19)
CEO relative D/E ratio 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.000 0.001∗ 0.001∗
(1.88) (1.92) (1.75) (0.87) (1.72) (1.73)
CEO eff. ownership 0.163 0.134 0.139 0.534 0.135 0.143
(0.42) (0.34) (0.34) (1.37) (0.34) (0.35)
CEO vega 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.10) (0.53) (0.97) (1.42) (1.39) (0.90)
CEO exercised options 0.008 0.008 0.009∗ 0.010∗ 0.010∗ 0.009∗
(1.62) (1.54) (1.73) (1.74) (1.75) (1.75)
Acquisitions -0.110∗∗ -0.093∗∗ -0.075∗ -0.101∗∗ -0.098∗∗
(-2.21) (-1.97) (-1.73) (-2.10) (-2.06)
E-index 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.009
(1.22) (1.07) (0.96) (1.17)
CEO FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes No No
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Calendar time FE No No No No Yes No
Fiscal month FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 5,141 4,787 4,464 4,673 4,464 4,464




Our framework builds on the model of Bolton et al. (2015). The firm’s CEO can invest
an amount I at t = 0 and obtain a random payoff x̃ at t = 1 that can take three values:
• A high payoff x+ (1 + µ)∆ with probability q;
• A medium payoff x with probability (1− 2q);
• A low payoff x− δ with probability q.
Given that there are three possible states of the world, the probability q < 1
2
represents
tail risk (i.e., the variance of the investment technology) and is the choice variable for the
CEO. µ ∈ (0, 1) represents the firm’s profitability: the higher µ, the higher is the upside
potential of the investment. The CEO can change q at the cost c(q) = 1
2
aq2.
To finance investments, the firm raises external funds at the rate R under the con-
straint that risk-neutral external creditors obtain a total return 1+R at least equal to the
risk-free return, which is assumed to be 1 for simplicity. Under the additional assump-
tion that the firm defaults only when the investment payoff is low, the payoff promised
to creditors has to satisfy
(1− q)(1 +R) + q(x− δ) ≥ 1. (A.1)





with the additional assumptions x < 1 + δ and x > 1 + 1
2
δ. These assumptions, in
conjunction with the fact that R is strictly increasing in q, ensure that default only
occurs when the payoff is low. The CEO total pay W is given by
W = w̄ + SEPE + SDD, (A.3)
where w̄ represents the fixed salary, SE the share of equity, PE the price of equity, SD the
loading on deferred compensation, and D the expected value of deferred compensation.19
The equity component and deferred compensation are paid at t = 1, whereas salary is
paid at t = 0 and is thus not subject to default risk. The price of equity is given by the
present value of cash flows net of operational costs:




Deferred compensation can be interpreted as salary (or other forms of compensation)
kept inside the firm for one period, which makes it exposed to the investment project’s
payoff.
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We consider two types of deferred compensation management. The first is a scheme
where the CEO receive the total amount of deferred compensation (D̄) if the company
is solvent, that is with probability 1 − q, and a fraction 0 < α < 1 of it if the company
is insolvent. Under this scheme, the expected value of deferred compensation is given by
D = (1− q)D̄+ qαD̄, where D̄ is some positive constant decided at the time the contract
is signed. We call this contract “non-discretionary”.
We also consider a “discretionary” contract that allows the CEO to modify the in-
vestment strategy of deferred compensation. Under this contract, the expected payoff of
deferred compensation is
D = βPE + (1− β)qαC̄, (A.5)
where C̄ represents the cash flow of the alternative assets. These assets pay off with
probability q, i.e., the probability of extreme company cash flows. As a result, such assets
may be used by the CEO to increase cash flows in states where cash flows from other assets
(equity and deferred compensation) are low.20 Also in this case, the parameter 0 < α < 1
explicitly accounts for the fact that only a fraction of the value of alternative investment
is received in bankruptcy (see Section 3).21 The CEO can modify the composition of the
deferred compensation by changing β at the cost c(β) = 1
2
bβ2. We assume that the CEO
cannot short-sell his/her own company stock, i.e., we impose β ≥ 0.
In summary, under the non-discretionary contract, the CEO only selects the risk of
investment and thus solves the problem
max
q
w̄ + SEPE + SDD (A.6)








D = (1− q)D̄ + qαD̄. (A.8)
Under the discretionary contract, the CEO can also choose the composition of his/her
deferred compensation and thus solves
max
q,β




s.t. 0 ≤ q ≤ 1
2
, β ≥ 0,
where




D = βPE + (1− β)qαC̄. (A.11)
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Note that, when defining the discretionary contract, we assume that the cost of changing
the composition of the deferred compensation is sustained by the CEO. One could also
assume that the cost is borne by shareholders. In this case, the quantity 1
2
aq2 should be
subtracted from the stock price PE. These two alternatives produce qualitatively identical
results. However, if one subtracts the cost 1
2
aq2 from the stock price PE, the maximization
problem (A.9) becomes non-concave and no closed form solution is available.22











be the unconstrained risk-taking policy under the non-discretionary deferred compensation
contract. The optimal constrained policy q̂NDIS is given by
q̂NDIS =

0, if q̃1 < 0;






, if q̃1 ≥ 12 .
(A.12)
Proof. See Section OA.1 of the Online Appendix.
According to Proposition 1, the CEO takes on more risk when the firm’s profitability,
as measured by µ, is high. This result hinges on the usual limited liability assumption
that leaves creditors bearing the cost of default and gives the CEO the gains of success-
ful investments. The effect of the firm’s profitability is counterbalanced by the deferred
compensation: the CEO has the incentive to reduce firm risk to increase the probability
to receive the deferred compensation and, as a result, increase his/her expected compen-
sation. Therefore, the higher is the amount of deferred compensation the lower is the
amount of risk that the CEO decides to take. This result is valid only if α < 1. If α = 1,






which means that risk-taking incentives increase with equity compensation.
We consider now the discretionary contract.













where πF (q) = q [(1 + µ)∆− δ] + (1− q)x− 1 represents the firm’s expected payoff. q̂DIS
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is the optimal discretionary risk choice and is given by
q̂DIS (β) =

0, if q̃2 (β) < 0;


















is the unconstrained risk-taking policy under the discretionary deferred compensation con-
tract. The associated investment strategy of the deferred compensation plan is
β̂ =
{
0, if π (q̃2(0))− q̃2(0)C̄ − 12aq(0)
2 < 0;




Finally, for any β̂ ∈ [0, 1], q̂DIS ≥ q̂NDIS and the difference q̂DIS − q̂NDIS decreases with
β̂.
Proof. See Section OA.1 of the Online Appendix..
Several implications follow from Proposition 2. First, the possibility to modify the
investment strategy of deferred compensation modifies the CEO risk-taking incentives
only if α > 0, namely as long as a fraction (no matter how small) of deferred compensation
is recovered in bankruptcy.
Second, the higher the expected payoff of the firm’s investment compared to the
payoff of the alternative investment opportunity, the higher is the fraction of deferred
compensation the CEO desires to invest in the firm stock. On the contrary, when the
alternative investment opportunity is expected to deliver higher payoffs than the firm
stock, the CEO has an incentive to short the firm stock. As a result, the short selling
constraint binds and the optimal β̂ is equal to zero.
Third, when, β̂ ∈ [0, 1], the discretionary investment policy increases CEO risk-taking
incentives23. The incremental risk induced by the discretionary policy decreases with the
fraction of wealth tied to company stock β̂: the lower the fraction of wealth tied to
company stock, the higher the incremental risk induced by the discretionary policy is.
This result has to be interpreted in conjunction with the fact that the fraction of wealth
tied to the firm stock increases with the expected payoff of the firm’s investment. This
means that, when the payoff of the investment is expected to be low, the CEO desires to
decrease the fraction of deferred compensation tied to company stock and, at the same
time, finds it optimal to take on more risk.
Fourth, when the firm’s expected payoff is sufficiently larger than the expected pay-
off of alternative investments, the CEO might find it optimal to overweight company
stock, namely to select β̂ > 1, short sell the alternative assets, and invest the proceeds
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in the company stock. This would mean that the CEO borrows against his/her de-
ferred compensation to buy additional shares of the company stock.24 In this case, the
risk-shifting problem is less severe and creditors are not damaged. In other words, the
discretionary contract is akin to an option that allows the CEO to exchange the standard
non-discretionary contract with a contract that delivers a positive payoff when the firm is
in default. To keep the standard deferred compensation contract, the CEO selects β > 1.
In this case, A ≡ SD(1−β̂)
SE+β̂SD






(1 + µ)∆− δ − |A|αC̄
]
,
which is in fact similar to the risk choice under the standard non-discretionary contract.
In particular, we observe that in this case the deferred cash flows C̄ has a negative effect
on the risk choice of the CEO, similarly to the deferred compensation D̄ in Proposition
2.
When the firm’s expected profitability is low, the CEO exercises the exchange option
by choosing β < 1. In this case, A ≡ SD(1−β̂)
SE+β̂SD
> 0 and the deferred cash flow C̄ has a
positive effect on CEO risk incentives, because it allows the CEO to increase the expected












where the second term on the right hand side of (A.15) is positive, while the sign of the
first term is ambiguous.
A.2 Definition of variables
See Appendix Table A.1.
[Insert Appendix Table A.1 about here]
A.3 Sample characteristics
Appendix Table A.2 provides information on the characteristics (number of observations,
number of firms, number of CEOs, mean CEO tenure, median CEO tenure, turnover
frequency, and withdrawal frequency) of the main estimation samples used in the paper.
[Insert Table A.2 about here]
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Table A.1: Definition of variables
Variable Databases Definition
Deferred compensation return ExecuComp Return on non-qualified deferred compensation plans computed by using information on each CEO’s annual
earnings. The annual return is computed by dividing the CEO’s annual earnings by the beginning-of-year
deferred compensation plans’ balance. The beginning-of-year balance is obtained from subtracting CEO’s
and firm’s contributions and CEO’s annual earnings from the end-of-year balance (Jackson and Honigsberg,
2014).
Deferred compensation return (alt.) ExecuComp Same definition as Deferred compensation return, but adding back CEO’s withdrawals over the fiscal year
to the beginning-of-year balance in the denominator.
Stock return ExecuComp Total stock return over the fiscal year.
Idiosyncratic return ExecuComp, Kenneth
French’s website
Difference between Stock return and the equally weighted industry return (based on Fama-French 48 industry
groups).
Market-adjusted industry return ExecuComp, Kenneth
French’s website
Difference between the equally weighted industry return (based on Fama-French 48 industry groups) and
the equally weighted market return.
Z-score CCM Altman’s Z-score computed as −3.3 × (pi/at) − (sale/at) − 1.4 × (re/at) −
1.2×((act−lct)/at) − 0.6×((prcc f· csho)/lt).
Distress zone CCM Indicator variable equal to one if Z-score exceeds -1.81 in a given firm year.
Gray zone CCM Indicator variable equal to one if Z-score is between -2.99 and -1.81 in a given firm year.
Z-score (top 25%) CCM Indicator variable equal to one if a given firm-year belongs to the top quartile of the Altman’s Z-score. The
Altman’s Z-score quartiles are computed over the CCM universe.
Size CCM Firm size defined as the natural logarithm of total assets.
CEO age ExecuComp CEO’s age. If age information is missing, we use the CEOs’ median age.
CEO tenure ExecuComp Number of years the CEO has been in office.
CEO turnover ExecuComp Indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is replaced in a given year.
CEO relative D/E ratio ExecuComp, CCM Ratio of CEO inside debt holdings to equity incentives divided by the firm’s D/E ratio based on information
from ExecuComp (see, e.g., Cassel et al., 2012).
CEO effective ownership ExecuComp, CCM CEO fractional ownership adjusted for the CEO’s portfolio of option incentives.
CEO vega ExecuComp, CCM Total vega of the CEO’s portfolio of option incentives,
CEO exercised options ExecuComp Value of the CEO’s option exercises in a given year (scaled by total annual compensation).
Withdrawal ExecuComp Indicator variable equal to one if the CEO withdraws a non-zero amount from his/her deferred compensation
balance in a given year.
E-index RiskMetrics Entrenchment index of corporate governance as defined by Bebchuck et al. (2009).
Acquisitions CCM Firm M&A activity as measured by cash acquisitions (scaled by total assets).
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Table A.2: Sample characteristics
This table provides information on the characteristics of several of the samples used throughout the paper: Number
of observations, number of firms, number of CEOs, mean CEO tenure, median CEO tenure, turnover frequency, and
withdrawal frequency. The samples on each row of the table are defined as follows: [1] corresponds to the sample used in
Panel A of Table 1; [2] corresponds to the sample used in column 2 of Panel B of Table 4; [3] corresponds to the sample
used in column 1 of Table 6.
Sample Obs. No. No. CEO tenure CEO tenure Turnover Withdrawal
firms CEOs (mean) (median) frequency frequency
[1] 6,097 969 1,516 6.694 5.000 0.116 0.112
[2] 5,471 889 1,371 6.648 5.000 0.110 0.110
[3] 1,656 480 513 6.755 5.000 0.096 0.108
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Data availability statement
The data that support the findings of this study are from subscription-based databases
accessed through Wharton Research Data Services. Restrictions apply to the availability
of these data, which are available from the authors upon permission of the data providers.
Notes
1Several studies provide evidence consistent with this view. See, e.g., Sundaram and Yermack (2007)
and Cassel et al. (2012).
2See references in Anantharaman et al. (2014).
3This section is based on Bebchuk and Jackson (2005), Anantharaman et al. (2014), Wei and Yermack
(2011), Jackson and Honigsberg (2014), Walker (2018), and on the webpages of the US Department of
Labor and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
4Anantharaman et al. (2014) show that the risk-mitigating effect of inside debt is driven by SERPs,
which most closely satisfy the conditions set forth by Jensen and Meckling (1976) for inside debt to curb
risk-taking, namely (i) being unsecured in bankruptcy and (ii) paying a fixed payoff in non-bankruptcy
states.
5A typical example here are 401(k) plans. Contribution made through these plans are generally
limited to $18, 000 per year.
6Unlike secular trusts, Rabbi trusts do not formally protect plan participants from bankruptcy (Ger-
akos, 2010). It is important to stress that no comprehensive information on Rabbi trusts is available,
therefore we cannot precisely quantify their seniority-enhancing effect on non-qualified DC plans.
7Whereas firms are not obliged to disclose the asset allocation of non-qualified DC plans (Walker,
2018), executives are subject to regular reporting requirements on insider transactions involving firm
securities held through these plans. Yet, as we discuss in Section OA.2 of the Online Appendix, these
investments may not be clearly identified as such within the overall (indirect) equity holdings of each
executive, hence the lack of detailed information.
8We obtained this information on anecdotal and survey evidence from Walker (2018).
9The complete list of exemptions is provided under IRC Section 409A.
10Details can be found in Appendix Section A.1.
11401(k) plans are covered in ExecuComp only through the impact of contributions to such plans on
the annual compensation flow (within the item “All Other Compensation”). However, qualified DC
plans are likely to be of limited quantitative importance, because salary deferrals to these plans are
typically capped at $18,500 per year as of 2018 (see footnote 39 of Walker, 2018), a small amount for
top executives.
12Note that the baseline and the alternative measure of deferred compensation returns exhibit a high
correlation.
13Anantharaman et al. (2014) find that, while deferred compensation plans and pensions plans are of
comparable size over their sample ($3.8M vs. $3.9M), the risk-reducing effect of inside debt is driven by
pension plans.
14Morgan Lewis (2015) provide a detailed discussion of the treatment of target firms’ deferred compen-
sation plans subject to IRC Section 409A. IRC Section 409A sets forth conditions under which accelerated
vesting and payout of the plans can take place after M&As, defining precisely what constitutes a “change
in control”. Conditions under which parties involved in the M&A transaction can extend the plan vesting
schedule or terminate the plan are also defined. Thus, the specifics of M&A transactions, through their
implications for the range of allowed deferred compensation changes, have the potential to substantially
alter managerial risk-taking incentives. Several studies look at modifications of executive compensation
arrangements around M&As. Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) study compensation contracts and
career outcomes of target firms’ executives, but do not look specifically at inside debt. By contrast,
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Phan (2014) investigates the dynamics of inside debt following M&As, but focuses on acquiring firms,
finding that CEO inside debt incentives tend to be adjusted to the post-M&A firm capital structure.
15We limit the analysis to this window to focus on the immediate effect of the financial crisis.
16The algorithm is described in detail in Appendix A.2 of Clementi and Cooley (2009) and in Appendix
B.1.1 of Morales (2015). Their algorithm extracts the net number of shares sold by the CEO from the
law of motion for the number of shares held by him/her. Thus, the key pieces of information are the
CEO’s total shareholdings at the beginning and at the end of the year, the number of options that vested
during the year, and the number of shares the CEO exercises during the year. If the net number of shares
sold by the CEO is negative (i.e., the CEO actively purchased shares during the year), the net revenue
from stock trading is assumed to be zero. If the net number of shares sold by the CEO is positive, the
net revenue from trading is the maximum between (i) zero and (ii) the net number of shares sold times
the average stock price over the year minus the cost of exercised options. We follow Clementi and Cooley
(2009) and assume that the CEO’s net sales of stock are carried out at the average stock price observed
during the year.
17This group includes also those firms that exit our sample in the three years after the onset of distress
(as long as this happens before the end of the sample period in 2015): the assumption here is that firms
prematurely exiting the sample are especially likely to be under stress (e.g., bankruptcy, exclusion from
S&P 1500 indexes, acquisition by a more efficient competitor, etc.).
18This result hinges on the customary limited liability assumption: the creditors bear the cost of
default, whereas the CEO enjoys the gains of successful risky investments.
19More precisely, Bolton et al. (2015) assume that the compensation package of the CEO depends on
salary, equity, and the company’s credit spread. Thus, the first two components of our compensation
package are the same as those in Bolton et al. (2015). Our setting departs from theirs through the third
component.
20Note that we do not model the optimal compensation structure problem from the point of view of
shareholders. We assume that such a contract is in place and analyze, theoretically and empirically, the
implications of such a contract for managerial choices and firm risk.
21The value of equity is zero in bankruptcy and, thus, there is no reason to scale down the first element
on the right hand side of equation (A.5).
22More precisely, it is easy to see that in this case the equation for D, which includes the term βPE ,
would contain the quantity − 12bβ
3, which, in turn, would make the objective function non-concave.
23This assumption is required to make the model realistic. In the absence of this assumption, the CEO
may borrow against his/her deferred compensation to invest in the company stock. First, employees can-
not take loans out of non-qualified deferred compensation plans, which are widespread among CEOs (see,
e.g., https://www.fidelity.com/viewpoints/retirement/nqdc). Second, while in the past it was common
practice for firms to extend loans to their executives to buy company stock with the goal of increasing
CEO ownership, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 forbade this type of loans (Kahle and Shastri, 2004)
and our empirical analysis below focuses on the post-2006 period.
24Note that we could exclude this case by adding one additional constraint to the maximization
problem. We prefer not to do it for two reasons. First, the additional constraint would complicate
the exposition of the optimal policy. Second, it is interesting to study the conditions under which the
CEO desires to overweight the firm stock.
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“CEO Investment of Deferred Compensation Plans
and Firm Performance”
OA.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Under the non-discretionary contract the CEO solves
max
q













λ0 is the multiplier attached to the constraint q ≥ 0 and λ 1
2
is the multiplier attached to
the constraint q ≤ 1
2
. Replacing PE, D, and R into the optimization problem, we obtain
max
q










The first order condition (FOC) with respect to q gives













be the unconstrained optimal policy. The optimal constrained policy q̂NDIS follows from
an application of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem and is given by
q̂NDIS =

0, if q̃1 < 0;






, if q̃1 ≥ 12 .
(OA.1)
Proof of Proposition 2. Under the discretionary contract, the CEO solves
max
q,β
w̄ + SEPE + SDD −
1
2
bβ2 + λ0q − λ 1
2
q + ν0β, (OA.2)
where









and ν0 is the multiplier attached to the constraint β ≥ 0. Replacing PE, D, and R into
the optimization problem, we obtain
max
q,β



















− SDqαC̄ − bβ + ν0 = 0.










and therefore the optimal constrained risk choice is
q̂DIS =

0, if q̃2 < 0;






, if q̃2 ≥ 12 .
(OA.6)
Let now πF (q) be the payoff of the firm’s assets expressed as a function of the probability
chosen by the CEO
πF (q) = q(x+ (1 + µ)∆) + (1− 2q)x− (1− q)(1 +R)
= q(x+ (1 + µ)∆) + (1− 2q)x− (1− q)1− q(x− δ)
1− q
= q(x+ (1 + µ)∆) + (1− 2q)x− 1 + q(x− δ)
= q(x+ (1 + µ)∆) + (1− q)x− 1− qδ
= q(x+ (1 + µ)∆− δ) + (1− q)x− 1.























Note that β̃ is only implicitly defined by equation (OA.7). The reason is that the right-
hand side of equation (OA.7) depends on β̃ through the optimal risk choice q̃. Assume for
the moment that a solution to the fixed point problem (OA.7) exists and let this solution




0, if π (q̃2(0))− q̃2(0)C̄ − 12aq̃2(0)
2 < 0;




Concerning the existence and uniqueness of β∗, note that the Brouwer’s fixed-point the-
orem guarantees that there must be at least one β∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that equation (OA.7)
holds. For any optimal β̂ ∈ [0, 1], we have that












As a result, the difference between q̂DIS and q̂NDIS is given by
q̂DIS − q̂NDIS =


































− q̃1, if 0 < q̃1 < 12 < q̃2;
0, if 0 < 1
2
































0, if 0 < 1
2
< q̃1 < q̃2.
(OA.11)
OA.2 Insider transactions reported in Form 5 filings
Here, we seek to provide direct evidence of the CEOs’ reshuffling of deferred compensa-
tion investment away from firm equity in distress. To this end, we obtain information
from CEOs’ transactions on firm equity from SEC’s Form 5 filings. On these filings,
CEOs disclose their insider transactions on a given firm’s security (including derivatives)
throughout the year.1 Firm securities held (indirectly) through nonqualified DC plans
are no exception to this disclosure rule (see footnote 7).
More specifically, we match each firm’s SEC CIK code to its CCM identifier (gvkey)
by means of the Wharton Research Data Service’s SEC Analytics Suite and obtain the
online link to Form 5 filings. We then randomly select a sample of 50 firm-years for
which we manually retrieve Form 5 information on 223 CEO equity transactions. It is
problematic to provide a precise measure of CEO personal return on Form 5 transactions.
Because of this, rather than directly validating our deferred compensation return measure
against these transactions, we explore the overall direction of CEO transactions when a
firm is in the distress zone vis-a-vis other times.
In the näıve analysis of Table OA.1 on “trading imbalance”, we compare the number
of purchases vs. sales of own equity (or own equity derivatives) carried out by CEOs
in the random sample of 50 firm-years. Looking at the trading behavior of CEOs on
direct and indirect equity positions, we distinguish between firm-years inside and outside
1CEOs timely report each relevant transaction in Form 4 filings. All Form 4 transactions are jointly
reported in Form 5 at the end of the year.
IV
the distress zone. Firm securities held through nonqualified DC (the focus of the main
analysis) and qualified DC plans are classified as indirect positions. However, except
for the case of qualified DC plans (such as 401(k) plans and employee stock ownership
plans) and a few cases of securities held by relatives, no clear information on the nature
of indirect ownership is provided in Form 5 filings. Given that our model’s implications
extend to the case of qualified DC plans, we group together all indirect positions and
analyze them jointly.
Outside the distress zone, 25.9% of all (direct and indirect) transactions are sales
as opposed to 23.3% in the distress zone. If we distinguish between direct and indirect
positions, we see that inside the distress zone 42.8% of indirect transactions are sales as
opposed to only 17.3% of direct transactions. Outside the distress zone, 35.8% (19.1%)
of direct (indirect) transactions are sales. Although this is evidence based on a small
sample, it suggests that in distress CEOs tend to reduce their exposure to firm risk
through indirect positions, such as those held through deferred compensation plans. This
finding corroborates the main result of the paper.
[Insert Table OA.1 about here]
OA.3 Further tests
In this section, we present several additional checks relating to the empirical definition
of distress.
Alternative distress definition. We test how sensitive our baseline results in Table 4
are to the definition of distress. In column 1 of Table OA.2, we add to the baseline
specification the interaction between the stock return and the indicator variable Gray
zone, which captures a moderate financial health deterioration. The interaction with
Distress zone here displays a negative but statistically insignificant at conventional levels
(p-value= 0.17) coefficient. Note that by including the interaction with Gray zone, we de
facto use firms that are neither in the distress zone nor in the gray zone as the reference
group, whereas in the baseline analysis the reference group includes also those in the gray
zone. To put it differently, CEOs of firms in the distress zone tend to reduce the exposure
to own stocks especially if compared to CEOs of firms in the gray zone. One possible
explanation is that CEOs in the gray zone, upon the first signs of declining financial
health, seek to bolster stock performance by investing in their own firm, as indicated
by the positive (albeit insignificant) coefficient estimate for Gray zone × Stock return, a
behavior that reverses if the situation keeps deteriorating and the firm enters the distress
zone.
In column 2, we replace the Distress zone indicator with Z-score (top 25%), an indi-
cator variable equal to one if a firm-year’s Z-score is above the 75th percentile (= −1.42,
defined over the CCM universe rather than over our final sample). Under this more re-
strictive definition of distress, the results remain qualitatively unchanged relative to the
baseline case.
V
[Insert Table OA.2 about here]
Changes in distress status. Appendix Table OA.3 further explores how the CEO’s de-
ferred compensation strategy changes around distress. In column 1, we look at changes in
distress status using Distress zone (change). The correlation between deferred compen-
sation returns and stock returns is statistically indistinguishable from zero (column 1),
possibly due to the masking effect of looking together at positive and negative changes
in distress status. In column 2, we thus distinguish between instances in which firms
enter (Distress zone (enter) = 1) and exit (Distress zone (exit) = 1) the distress zone.
Whereas both events are linked to lower correlation of deferred compensation returns
with stock returns, only the interaction with Distress zone (exit) is statistically signifi-
cant. Such a result points to a sluggish and persistent effect of distress on the investment
strategy of the CEOs, which is consistent with the findings in Panel B of Table 4. In
other words, CEOs do lower their exposure to the firm stock during times of distress, but
they may not increase the exposure as soon as the firm exits distress.
[Insert Table OA.3 about here]
VI
Table OA.1: CEO transactions reported in a random sample of Form 5 filings
This table provides information on the direction (purchases vs. sales) of transactions carried out by CEOs on equity
(derivative) securities of the firm. Information on these transaction is from Form 5 filings of a random sample of 50 firm-
years. Transactions executed in firm-years in the distress zone (i.e., with a Z-score above -1.81) are compared to those from
the rest of the sample. The samples on each row of the table are defined as follows: [1] corresponds to all transactions for
which information is available in the random sample of Form 5 filings; [2] corresponds to those transactions on positions
held directly by the CEO; [3] corresponds to those transactions on positions held indirectly by the CEO (e.g., through
savings plans, trusts, etc.).
Outside distress zone Inside distress zone
No. purchases No. sales No. purchases No. sales
[1] All positions 143 50 23 7
[2] Direct positions 50 28 19 4
[3] Indirect positions 93 22 4 3
Table OA.2: Alternative distress definitions
This table reports panel regressions of CEO deferred compensation returns (baseline measure) on stock returns conditioning
on firms’ distress status over the period 2006-2015. Column 1 augments the specification in column 2 of Table 4 with the
interaction between stock returns and Gray zone, an indicator variable equal to one if a firm-year exhibits a Z-score between
-2.99 and -1.81. Column 2 uses the alternative distress indicator Z-score (top 25%), which is equal to one if a firm-year
belongs to the top quartile of the Z-score (the quartiles are computed over the CCM universe). All specifications include
control variables (size, CEO age, CEO tenure, and the CEO relative D/E ratio) and CEO fixed effects. The t-statistics are
calculated with robust standard errors clustered by CEO. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗,
∗∗∗, respectively. Refer to Appendix Table A.1 for variable definitions.
Def. comp. return
(1) (2)








Z-score (top 25%) × Stock return -0.078∗∗
(-2.53)
Z-score (top 25%) -0.004
(-0.14)




CEO age 0.016 0.015
(0.91) (0.86)
CEO tenure -0.003 -0.004
(-0.10) (-0.13)
CEO relative D/E ratio 0.001∗ 0.001∗
(1.83) (1.85)
CEO FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Observations 5,145 5,145
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.20
VIII
Table OA.3: Deferred compensation returns and stock returns: Change in distress status
This table reports panel regressions of CEO deferred compensation returns (baseline measure) on stock returns augmented
with changes in distress status over the period 2006-2015. Column 1 interacts stock returns with Distress zone (change),
which is coded as 1 when the firm enters the distress zone (i.e., Z-score above -1.81), as 0 when the distress status does
not change, and -1 when the firm exits the distress zone. Column 2 interacts stock returns with Distress zone (enter), an
indicator equal to one if a firm enters the distress zone in a given year, and Distress zone (exit), an indicator equal to one
if a firm exits the distress zone in a given year. All specifications include control variables (size, CEO age, CEO tenure,
and the CEO relative D/E ratio), CEO fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The t-statistics are calculated with robust
standard errors clustered by CEO. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗, respectively. Refer
to Appendix Table A.1 for variable definitions.
Def. comp. return
(1) (2)
Distress zone (change) × Stock return 0.025
(0.86)
Distress zone (change) -0.018
(-1.05)
Distress zone (enter) × Stock return -0.053
(-1.02)
Distress zone (enter) -0.008
(-0.39)
Distress zone (exit) × Stock return -0.143∗∗∗
(-2.58)
Distress zone (exit) 0.122∗∗∗
(2.80)




CEO age -0.001 -0.003
(-0.03) (-0.07)
CEO tenure 0.019 0.019
(0.77) (0.78)
CEO relative D/E ratio 0.001∗ 0.001∗
(1.89) (1.86)
CEO FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Observations 4,064 4,064
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.25
IX
